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ATTENTION. By W. B. Pillsbury. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. x, 366.

This addition to the "Library of Philosophy" is an expansion of a volume published in 1906 in the "Bibliothèque internationale de psychologie expérimentale." It is a useful monograph, containing almost everything important that has been said on the subject of attention, and a good deal about other subjects; chapters on "Attention and Ideas," "Attention and Association," "Attention and Reason," tend almost inevitably to develop in part into separate treatises on ideas, association and reason. On the whole, however, the continuity of the main subject is creditably maintained in a material that is difficult to manage. The summaries of results at the end of each chapter are useful in maintaining it.

The strongest part of the book is that which concerns experimental psychology; Professor Pillsbury has himself contributed to the laboratory investigation of attention, and is well acquainted with the literature of other people's results. The weakest part has to do with points in the fundamental analysis of mind. The discussions on "activity," for instance, do not leave a clear impression; it is sometimes hard to see whether the author is intending to deny the fact of activity or only the "feeling" of it, or to reduce the feeling to sensations. It is difficult in the end to make out the relation of his position to such a view as Dr. Stout's. Again (p. 129) we find, "It is a generally accepted fact that all other mental states are but combinations of sensations in some form or other" (sensations including images). The point is not very important for the author's purpose, and one feels that so startlingly debatable a statement need hardly have been brought in at all, but if it is to be made it had better be anticipated before page 36, where Professor Pillsbury explains that an important precondition for attention to an object is to have in mind what he calls alternately an "image" of the object and an "idea." Those who are accustomed to distinguish between these two will have a difficulty in following the discussion without such a warning, since they will incline to agree thoroughly about the second point and to hesitate about the first. It seems unnecessarily controversial, once more, to introduce "images" into the account of recognition (p. 41).

Two smaller complaints must be made. The book is written for the most part in good and pleasant English, which renders all the more disconcerting the odd slips in grammar which occur now and then: on page 5, "it is frequently denied that . . . but rather that"; on page 20, "when listening to a man walking . . . the hand would swing;" on page 35, "they [impressions] owe their origin . . . to having held the expected sensation in mind"; on page 315, "equally . . . as"; on page 317, "different . . . than." And the illustrations, which are most commendably numerous, are apt to be a little trite and sometimes unreal. There is a story about a builder and a geologist on page 63 which we do not believe.

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DIE KUNST DER RECHTSANWENDUNG: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Methodenlehre der Geisteswissenschaften. By Lorenz Brütt, Dr. Jur., Berlin: 1907. Pp. 214.

Dr. Brütt begins with a sketch of "critical positivism." The leading idea of this philosophy, which must not be confused with the "naïf positivism" of Comte, is "back to Kant." It is defined as the view which, holding that no knowledge of things in themselves is possible, confines itself to experience. A corollary, important for the matter in hand, is that no ethical judgments are objectively valid. Dr. Brütt's reasons for this view seem to be (1) that space and time are subjective forms of perception, and (2) that all propositions (except those of mathematics, which are purely formal and yield no fresh information about reality) are analytic. Other points on which he lays stress are the fallacies of confusing cause with reason (Spinoza) and of hypostatizing universals (Hegel). But it is not until section four that the bearing of these views on the theory of jurisprudence begins to appear. That section discusses the vexed subject of the theory of the interpretation of law, and begins by considering Savigny's theory of philological interpretation, which is rejected on the ground that the fixity of law is not to be exposed to the caprices of language, but demands a system of literal interpretation. On the other hand, literal interpretation notoriously breaks down; often, as in Section 833 of the German Civil Code (on the keeping of animals), the words may